Public Agenda Special Edition: Terrorism

Introduction

Overview

Bioterrorism

Public Opinion

Sources and Resources

Overview: The Issue at a Glance

There has not been a terrorist attack on U.S. soil since the fall of 2001. Yet the possibility is ever-present and guides much of what we do as a society. The "war on terrorism" is no mere metaphor; it has led us to two all-too-real wars in less than two years. At home, we live with periodic "orange alerts" and checkpoints.

While much has changed since Sept. 11, the "war on terrorism" debate boils down to a single theme: What are Americans willing to do? How much are we willing to spend in money, prestige, rights, lives? What bargains are we willing to make?

A great deal has already been accomplished. Security is tighter at airports and public areas, although probably not tight enough yet. The Taliban regime that harbored al Qaeda has been routed in Afghanistan and the U.S. claims some 3,000 al Qaeda members have been detained worldwide. The government has taken strides in preparing for a new bioterrorist attack. And whatever terrorist threat the regime of Saddam Hussein may have presented has now been removed.

That does not reduce the magnitude of the job ahead. Bombings in Saudi Arabia and Morocco show al Qaeda is scattered but far from defeated. While it's unclear who is responsible for a series of bombings in Iraq, they raise the fear among some experts that Islamic fundamentalist groups and former Hussein supporters have made common cause against the U.S. Al Qaeda cells have been broken up around the world but many of the organization's leaders are still at large with access to considerable funds and recruits. U.S. officials aren't sure whether Osama bin Laden, the Saudi multimillionaire who leads the group, is dead or alive. Either way, further attacks are still possible.

A Defining Moment

Terrorism is nothing new, either for the world at large or the United States. The world has seen terrorism become a weapon of war in domestic, regional and international disputes, sometimes linked to a specific conflict, as in Northern Ireland or the Basque separatist movement in Spain, or sometimes aimed at a broader target, as in bin Laden's campaign against the United States and Western influence in the Middle East.

Many of the elements of the Sept. 11 attacks had turned up before. Wall Street was a terrorist target as far back as 1920, when a massive bombing killed 30 people. Some of the older buildings in the financial district still bear the shrapnel scars, more than 80 years later. The deadly bombing of the American embassy in Beirut in 1983 marked the beginning of a sustained attack of violence against U.S. targets by various terrorist organizations based in the Mideast. That bombing and others in Beirut were suicide attacks, which later became a common strategy of Palestinian extremists on the West Bank. The live television coverage that brought the Sept. 11 attacks to a shocked world was far from unprecedented; much of the world was equally riveted when Palestinians killed Israeli athletes during the 1972 Munich Olympics.

But in scale and sheer brazenness, the Sept. 11 attacks dwarfed any previous acts. They were undeniably the worst act of terrorism in modern history, leaving roughly 3,000 dead and a psychic shock for Americans on the level of Pearl Harbor or the Kennedy assassination.

Politics of Terror

The end of the Cold War, and the breakup of the Soviet Union, changed the very nature of many terrorist organizations. The Soviet bloc was believed to have provided considerable aid to terrorist organizations and nations that supported them.

Terrorists were forced to find other sources of funding, which reportedly have included such activities as drug trafficking, underground banking systems and money laundering. Indeed, some terrorist groups, such as Hezbollah, run overt charitable arms, both to launder funds and to build public support. It's estimated that bin Laden has at his disposal $300 million in personal wealth.

The problem of concerted terrorist activity is not limited to the Mideast. But, for the U.S., the current threat is distinctly rooted among Islamic extremists, and the stakes have been raised by the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons and fears that terrorists might get their hands on nuclear devices.

The Afghan campaign was also an early indication of how diplomatically complex the war on terrorism might be. To most Americans, military action seemed one of the most straightforward steps to take: al Qaeda was using Afghanistan as a base to attack the U.S., with the compliance of the Taliban regime. True, the U.S. was able to build and hold an international coalition to either support the campaign or at least not interfere. But as part of keeping Pakistan's support -- critical to isolating the Taliban -- the U.S. also risked being dragged into Pakistan's long-running feud with India over the disputed province of Kashmir. Likewise, many Arab states consider U.S. pressure to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict the price of their support in pursing terrorists.

That support is critical, most experts say, because it reduces the number of places terrorists have to hide. A worldwide effort to identify al Qaeda cells, cut off their funds and arrest their members requires the active cooperation of intelligence services and police forces in many countries. But those countries, particularly in the Middle East, may have political agendas that don't match our own and police forces who don't share our views on human rights. Working with them may mean that the U.S. will face making bargains it would rather not make.

Another, related issue is how the U.S. should deal with anti-Americanism in the Islamic world. Rightly or not, many in the Middle East and elsewhere are frustrated with U.S. policy and the spread of American culture. A Gallup survey found while majorities in eight of nine Islamic countries condemned the Sept. 11 attacks, majorities also considered the U.S. military response "morally unjustifiable." An August 2002 survey found majorities in six European countries believe U.S. foreign policy is partly to blame for the attacks. Many Americans would say this is "blaming the victim," but it is still a factor policymakers must deal with.

"Around the world, from Western Europe to the Far East, many see the United States as arrogant, hypocritical, self-absorbed, self-indulgent, and contemptuous of others," concluded a report by the Council on Foreign Relations. Experts say that helps create a climate which, if it does not actually create terrorists, makes others in the world less likely to help us find the terrorists. The Bush administration is making efforts to improve "public diplomacy," but the council concluded the government needs to do more.

The U.S. invasion of Iraq will also certainly affect world attitudes in the war on terrorism. Critics warned before the war that a U.S. attack would inflame or at least confirm anti-Americanism in the region. A U.S. invasion of an Arab nation will give al Qaeda a powerful recruiting tool among already disaffected Arab youth, critics said.

The Bush administration said it was worth risking that backlash to eliminate the possibility that the Hussein regime might give biological or chemical weapons to terrorists. Some administration supporters argue that establishing a stable democracy in Iraq under U.S. auspices would be the best antidote to anti-Americanism. Such a regime in Iraq would inspire democracy movements throughout the region and prove the U.S. lives up to its ideals, they contend. And by showing how far the U.S. is willing to go to protect its interests, they contend the Iraq war sends a powerful message to other countries that may have links to terrorists, such as Iran and Syria.

The Home Front

The first question on Sept. 11 was "how could this happen?" The answer seems to be a series of small failures and missed signals, some insignificant in themselves, that added up to disaster. The CIA and FBI failed to share information and both agencies apparently missed opportunities to pick up on the plot. Immigration officials failed in some cases to keep the hijackers from entering the country and in others to deport those who overstayed their visas. Airport security screening, obviously, failed to keep the hijackers off the planes.

Trying to rebuild our barricades against terrorism has led to one of the biggest overhauls of the federal government since World War II.

The federal government has taken over airport security, long run by the airline industry. The FBI director has pledged to make counterterrorism the agency's top priority. A new Department of Homeland Security has been created, second only to the Pentagon in personnel, and absorbing agencies as varied as the Secret Service, Border Patrol, Customs Service and the Coast Guard.

But no matter how many officials are assigned to security, they can't be everywhere. Some experts warn that improving security in one area only raises the threat elsewhere, because the terrorists will adjust. Increase airport security, and they might try to sneak bombs in through seaports, or in trucks. It's an ongoing challenge, with both sides shifting strategies constantly.

Another question is whether the government is going too far in seeking new powers to fight terrorism. The USA Patriot Act gave the government expanded powers to use so-called "roving wiretaps" and monitor e-mail, and the Justice Department has lifted longstanding restrictions against FBI agents conducting surveillance on religious groups and on prison officials eavesdropping on conversations between detainees and their lawyers.

In the months after Sept. 11, federal officials detained more than 1,000 suspects without releasing their names or conducting open hearings. Most of those detained were held on immigration charges or relatively minor criminal charges, and most apparently have been released or deported. In a May 2003 report to Congress, the Justice Department said it was holding 50 people as material witnesses in connection with the Sept. 11 attacks. But the Justice Department says a more detailed public accounting would both violate the privacy rights of the suspects and risks revealing useful information to al Qaeda. Civil liberties groups say secret hearings and indefinite detention violate basic human rights.

The fact that the Sept. 11 terrorists claimed to be acting in the name of Islam has put U.S. Muslims in an awkward position. Muslims and Arab-American groups have condemned the attacks, and last fall President Bush had called for tolerance. But there were hate crimes reported around the country after the Sept. 11 attacks and tightened security has reignited the debate over the legitimacy of racial profiling as a police tool.