CUTTING THE LIFELINE OF TERROR

WHAT’S NEXT AFTER IRAQ?

PRESENTATION TRANSCRIPT

Principal Remarks:

Daniel Yankelovich
Co-founder and Chairman, Public Agenda

Moderator:
Stephen Heintz
President, Rockefeller Brothers Fund

Responder:
Richard N. Haass
President, Council on Foreign Relations

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Cutting the Lifeline of Terror: What’s Next After Iraq?

Wednesday, July 14, 2004
The New York Academy of Sciences

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Stephen Heintz: We are here to talk about the fight against terrorism. There is no doubt that this perhaps is the most critical issue of our time. It is a very complex one. It’s one involving matters that we are only beginning to truly understand. It came in many ways as a big surprise. Perhaps it shouldn’t. Perhaps we should’ve known more along the way that would have prepared us better for the kinds of challenges we now face. But, nevertheless, we are where we are. It is a huge challenge for us to go forward. With the transfer of authority to an interim, new government in Iraq, this is a particularly good time to ask the question, “What’s next?” In fact, that is precisely the question that Dan Yankelovich will examine in his very interesting presentation tonight.
For 40 years, Dan has really been exploring the social experience and probing the hearts, minds, beliefs, attitudes, aspirations, hopes, and the fears of the American public. Dan has been named one of the ten most influential people of the century in the field of public affairs and communications. In addition to establishing Yankelovich, Skelly and White with my dear friend and colleague for many years in Connecticut, Arthur White, Dan started the Yankelovich New York Times Poll back in the 1970s. Dan’s newest venture, which is called “Viewpoint Learning,” is helping organizations grow through new forms of dialogue-based learning. Maybe you can tell us a little more about that tonight, as well.

Dan’s remarks, as you can see, are “Cutting the Lifeline of Terror. What’s Next After Iraq?” It’s going to just take us a moment to get his computer up on this podium so that he can go through this PowerPoint presentation. We then hope to hear from Richard Haass. Then, we will turn it over to your questions.

Dan, it has been a pleasure to work with you in advance on this project, and to have the opportunity to see in person a fascinating, very revealing, and very helpful presentation. The floor is yours.

Daniel Yankelovich: In the last few months, we’ve entered a new phase of the war on terror, with new questions being raised about our policy in Iraq. Among these questions, the most important by far is: what does the war in Iraq have to do with fighting Al Qaeda? Al Qaeda is the enemy that attacked us on 9/11, that is planning new attacks, and that has declared unconditional war against us.

The public does not have a good answer to this bewildering question, which is what opens it for public scrutiny. My presentation this evening is one attempt to deal with this question, and, if possible, move beyond it.
Before starting the presentation, I would like to say a word about my own point-of-view. Unlike most commentators on the war on terror, I’m not a foreign policy expert. I’m a social scientist who has spent his professional life studying social and political movements and the role public opinion plays in them. The reason this perspective is relevant to the war on terror is that our enemy, Al Qaeda, is part of a social/political movement: it is the militant tip of an Islamist movement that is spread throughout the Muslim world, particularly in nations allied to us such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. Moreover, it is gaining momentum in these and other Muslim nations.

This reality poses a very different kind of challenge than our military invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan. The American public is still in the early stages of understanding the true nature of the threat that this hate-America Islamic movement represents to our nation. I believe a social science perspective has some useful insights to offer. My goal, which is different from the goals of foreign policy experts, is to find a strategy for the war on terror that is capable of winning broad, public support – not only in the United States, but also in other nations, especially in the Muslim world.

Our best shot at shaping an effective strategy for waging the war on terror (which we do not now have) will require thoughtful foreign policy experts to open themselves to untraditional ways of thinking about the war on terror – not just from a social science perspective but also from the points of view of religious leaders, historians of Islam and those immersed in the workings of the global economy. We are up against a new and unconventional opponent, and we need to think about the challenge in new and unconventional ways.

**PRESENTATION**

My presentation starts with some important findings from public opinion surveys conducted in Muslim countries, among our Western European allies and here at home with the American electorate. After this review of public opinion data I will draw out the implications I see for the next stages of our Iraq engagement, and beyond Iraq to the larger Muslim world.
MUSLIM ATTITUDES

Chart 1: Surveys in Muslim countries show an extraordinary low level of trust in the Muslim world.*

Two numbers in this first chart are particularly noteworthy. Only one out of ten Muslims (12%) believes that the United States respects Islamic values, and even fewer (7%) feel that the West understands Muslim customs and culture. People in the Muslim world feel that we just don’t understand them.

* The graphics in Mr. Yankelovich’s remarks are selected from a full set of presentation slides. You can see the full set in the Articles and Speeches section of Public Agenda's web site www.publicagenda.org
**Chart 2:** The invasion of Iraq deepened animosity toward the United States in Arab countries. Here again, the numbers are about as dramatic as they can be. Those holding favorable opinions of the United States range from a mere 13% in Egypt to a derisory 3% in Saudi Arabia.
Chart 3: Majorities in seven out of eight Muslim countries worry about a military threat coming from the United States. From an American point-of-view this seems unbelievable, but it is what the people in these countries believe.
Chart 4: By nine-to-one margins, we in the United States believe that the Iraqis are going to be better off in the post-Saddam era. In Muslim countries, by margins of two-to-one, they believe they are going to be worse off.

Clearly, mistrust of the United States is not confined to a small number of extremists but spills over to the larger Muslim majority. The pervasive mistrust creates a climate that makes recruitment of terrorists fatally easy. It also makes it easy to channel frustration onto the United States. It supports extremist religious clerics and their jihad against us. Our use of military force in the Muslim world has exacerbated Muslim resentment. It makes the United States seem anti-Muslim in a world with 57 Muslim nations and 1.3 billion people.
THE VIEWS OF TRADITIONAL ALLIES

**Chart 5:** Now, let us take a snapshot of the attitudes of our traditional allies. Overall, the post-9/11 perception is that the United States is acting solely in its own interest without regard for the interests of its allies. That includes the British people, as well as the Germans, the French and others.

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**Post 9/11 perception:**
The U.S. is acting solely in its own interest, without regard for its allies

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Pew (for the Council on Foreign Relations)
**Chart 6:** Majorities in most Western European countries now consider the United States a threat to world peace!
**Chart 7:** The numbers that startle me the most are those shown below in Chart 7. I have rarely seen changes as sweeping as the magnitude of growth of unfavorable opinions towards the United States in a single year -- from 2002 to 2003, as a result of the war in Iraq.

Chart 7 shows that in some countries mistrust and dislike of the United States has doubled and tripled. In the space of a single year, you see an extraordinary transformation of the attitudes of the populations of nations historically friendly to the United States.

This massive loss of goodwill among our European allies will, inevitably, have negative consequences. Rightly or wrongly, much of the world has come to see U.S. military initiatives as lacking legitimacy. Our Muslim allies advised against our actions in Iraq. The failure to find
weapons of mass destruction greatly weakened our credibility. Other nations are now less willing to share the cost of our multi-national initiatives – in people or in money. We can no longer count on our traditional allies to help dispel the poisonous anti-Americanism in the Muslim world.

The Pew Global Attitudes Project, which conducted a great deal of the research in Muslim countries, drew the following conclusion from its research:

_The war in Iraq has widened the rift between Americans and Western Europeans, further inflamed the Muslim world, softened support for the war on terror, and significantly weakened global public support for the pillars of the post-World War II era—the UN and the North Atlantic Alliance._
HERE AT HOME

Here at home, the story is also one of faltering public support.

**Chart 8:** Before Saddam’s capture in December 2003, a considerable majority of the American public approved the direction of the war on terror and our military action in Afghanistan. They also felt that things were going well in the war on terror and would go even better a year later. Six out of ten approved the decision to go to war in Iraq.

Saddam’s capture was the high point of American optimism. The public linked Saddam Hussein directly to 9/11. Majorities of Americans believed that Saddam was directly supporting Al Qaeda and was personally involved in the 9/11 attacks. Therefore, apprehending Saddam greatly raised the public’s hopes.
**Chart 9:** Chart 9 shows that the vast majority of Americans believed that Saddam’s capture would restore peace and security in Iraq, and a majority also concluded that Bin Laden would be captured or killed and a democratic government established in Iraq. They believed that attacks on our troops would decrease and weapons of mass destruction be found.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>% Somewhat/Very Confident</th>
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<tr>
<td>Saddam's capture will restore peace &amp; security to Iraq</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saddam's capture will restore peace &amp; stability to the Middle East</td>
<td>70%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bin Laden will be captured or killed</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A democratic government will be established in Iraq</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attacks on troops will decrease</td>
<td>60%</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMDs will be found</td>
<td>54%</td>
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*ABC/Washington Post: December 14, 2003
**Gallup: December 14, 2003
Chart 10: Though Saddam’s capture initially stimulated support for the war in Iraq, it also created expectations that were soon dashed -- dramatically damaging public support for the war. A majority no longer endorses the decision to go to war. There has been a sharp rise in the belief that the war in Iraq is going badly.

![Chart 10](chart10.png)

There is a sharp rise in belief that the war is going badly
YANKELOVICH: CUTTING THE LIFELINE OF TERROR

Chart 11: A majority of Americans now feel that our country is on the wrong track. The public’s fears have been aroused. Increasingly, the public fears that the war in Iraq has made the world less safe from terror, and that (by a two-to-one margin) the United States has gotten bogged down in Iraq.

I can summarize the mindset of the American majority this way. Right after 9/11, Americans felt we had to strike back against the terrorists and that removing Saddam was the right thing to do because of his presumed help to Al Qaeda and direct link to the 9/11 attacks. In that cause, exaggerating the threat of weapons of mass destruction was acceptable. Now, however, the public has come to feel that we have no plan to win the war in Iraq, that we are
going to have trouble imposing democracy, and that we really don’t know very much about Islam and Islamic countries.

Americans are aware vaguely that anti-Americanism is growing. Some Americans worry about it a lot; others aren’t very bothered by it and think it’s normal if we are disliked because we are so rich and powerful, as long as we are also feared and respected.

THE SITUATION IN IRAQ

For several reasons, the Iraq-centered strategy has confused and polarized the American electorate. First, there was the matter of a number of shifting rationales for the war. The initial rationale was to destroy Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. Then came the rationale of preventing Iraq from supporting the terrorists – the notion that Iraq is the central battleground in the war on terror. Then came the rationale of removing a vicious dictator and bringing democracy to Iraq and the greater Middle East.

Compounding the confusion was the existence of yet another rationale that operated from behind the scenes. I identify this other rationale mainly with Paul Wolfowitz, who is the Administration’s principal theorist of the war in Iraq. It should be emphasized that the Wolfowitz rationale was largely devised before 9/11, whereas the rationales offered to the public were clearly working off of 9/11. The Wolfowitz rationale started with the claim that the Clinton deterrence policy in Iraq hadn’t worked and was weakening our credibility. Wolfowitz argued from a geopolitical point-of-view that deposing Saddam could be the key to stability in that troubled region, and that a democratic Iraq could become the linchpin of a new regional security strategy for the United States. Occupying Iraq, he argued, would give us added leverage with the countries neighboring Iraq – Saudi Arabia, Iran, Syria, Turkey. It would also help us with the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. This is true geopolitical theory. If Iraq weren’t located where it is, we probably would not have invaded it.
Wolfowitz also argued that the decisive use of force in Iraq to create “shock and awe” would dissuade other countries from the temptation of challenging the United States. While the public was given a changing menu of rationales, quite a different rationale operated behind the scenes. The relationship among all of these varying rationales has proven extraordinarily confusing.

**Chart 12:** With 20/20 hindsight, we can see that these shifting rationales created both mission creep and unrealistic public expectations. Chart 12 provides a summary of how U.S. involvement in Iraq now looks.

The emerging climate of opinion in the country is one of apprehension and anxiety about our troops in Iraq. There is growing awareness that our occupation is radicalizing Muslim moderates and reinforcing the role of the United States as a scapegoat. The issue is proving increasingly divisive here at home.
In the changing climate of opinion, there is considerable common ground for resolving the Iraqi conflict. Large numbers of both Republicans and Democrats appear to agree on the following fundamentals:

- We cannot abandon Iraq to chaos and instability.
- Sovereignty and internationalization can help prevent Iraq from becoming a black hole for U.S. money and troops.
- The cost to us is that we are going to have to yield some power and influence in Iraq.
- We may have to take our chances on fostering democracy, and maybe postpone it for a longer term.
- If we are serious about our national security, these costs are acceptable.

**Chart 13:** Interestingly, both political parties are moving in this direction.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>CHART 13</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Surprisingly, divergent political motivations lead to the same practical conclusions</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Our military occupation of Iraq has become counter-productive</td>
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<tr>
<td>○ It is radicalizing Muslim moderates</td>
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<tr>
<td>○ It is reinforcing our role as scapegoat</td>
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<tr>
<td>• We need to put Iraq behind us</td>
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<tr>
<td>• We need to stop Al Qaeda</td>
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<tr>
<td>• To do so, we need a smart political strategy as well as military force</td>
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Moving Beyond Iraq

Post-Iraq, I believe one overriding question will preoccupy us and unite the country: *how to stop new terrorist recruitment*. The public will gradually realize that nothing will contribute more to our nation’s safety than stopping terrorist recruitment rather than an Iraq-focused strategy. Here are a few key reasons why this is the case:

- Al Qaeda and its 40 or so affiliate organizations have demonstrated that they have the skills, experience, and commitment to harm the United States.
- Osama Bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and other Al Qaeda leaders are heroes in many parts of the Muslim world.
- The terrorists are clearly building momentum through new recruits.
- Stopping the flow of new recruits is our best hope for preventing a future 9/11.

What is needed for the future is a new level of public understanding for the true complexity of the war on terror. The public is coming to understand that, like our long struggle with communism, the war on terrorism is a political struggle even more than it is a military war. Even with poor intelligence, we know a lot about how to fight the military side of the war on terror. We don’t know as much about how to wage the political battle.

One of the obstacles is that our main opponent is not a government or a nation, but a religious/political movement spread throughout many Muslim nations. You need different tactics to counter a political movement than to fight a nation-state.

From an American perspective, despite the complexity of the Muslim world, we can clearly see three factions competing against one another that we need to understand better. The smallest is comprised of secularists who endorse the values of the West and who want the
Muslim world to adopt Western styles, values and culture. This is the least influential of the three groups – at a rough estimate of about 5% of the total.

At the other extreme are the hate-America Islamist fundamentalists, who are the most militant and totalitarian. The magnitude and influence of this group varies enormously. For example, in Indonesia this group has doubled, tripled, or quadrupled over the last few years. I would estimate that this group averages about 10% of all Muslims, with enormous variation from one Muslim country to another and particular strength in Arab nations.

The preponderant Muslim majority – the remaining 85% – are moderates who prefer Islamic culture to that of the West. It is among this majority group that we are losing ground. That’s where we have to begin to regain support for the United States. The growth and success of jihadists depends utterly on their ability to win the support of moderates to their hate-America cause, which is what has been happening and which is why we are slipping behind rather than moving further ahead.

The American public believes that America is hated for who we are, rather than for what we do. I believe this is profoundly incorrect, and further that it leads to a destructive fatalism that greatly damages our cause. It is certainly not why the hate-America jihadists say they hate us. The reason they give is that we prop up their autocratic governments and prevent them from building just societies.

It is crucial that Americans understand this point much better than we now do. The likelihood is that some of the distaste, hatred, and rejection among Muslim moderates can be traced to specific policies. Thank goodness, because policies are changeable. We cannot change who we are – and we do not want to.

Both Al Qaeda and the autocratic governments in the Middle East (e.g. Syria, Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia) have found it advantageous to distort American policies. It helps Al Qaeda gain recruits, and autocratic Muslim governments use the United States as a scapegoat to distract attention from domestic problems. The United States has become a big, fat scapegoat for every problem plaguing Muslim society.
HOW TO COUNTER HOSTILE POLITICAL MOVEMENTS

Chart 14: Now, here is where I would like to bring to bear my own social science experience and perspective. Studying social and political movements for a half-century, I have come to the conclusion that virtually every successful movement has three pillars of support: 1) a small group of committed militants; 2) a large group of moderates who usually disagree with the militants’ tactics but feel they have a legitimate grievance; and, what really gets the whole thing together, 3) a convenient scapegoat. These three pillars hold up and support successful social/political movements of every sort imaginable.

These are certainly the three supports of the hate-America Islamist movement, strengthening the movement in Indonesia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, Yemen and across the Muslim world. The one place the militant Islamists were weakest was, ironically, Iraq.
**Chart 15:** To counter this threat, we need both a military/intelligence strategy and a political strategy. We need the military/intelligence strategy to chop off the militant leg of the three-legged stool, because you can’t reason with the Al Qaeda militants. You can’t argue with them. They are determined to kill us. We have to deal with them through force and force alone.

But to address the other two legs, we need an enlightened long-term political strategy to (a) divide the moderates from the jihadists and (b) remove ourselves from the role of scapegoat. The right combination of military/political strategy will weaken this movement by isolating the militants. If the militants don’t have the support of the moderates and can be isolated, we will begin to prevail in the war on terror.
Al Qaeda and its affiliates have cells throughout the Muslim world. Many Muslim nations that are strongly allied to us have powerful Islamist fundamentalist movements they do not control. That’s the problem – the movements are very strong and the governments are not strong enough to control them. All the compromises and the arrangements that nations like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have made with these movements have created problems for us. The destruction of Al Qaeda-linked cells, in cooperation with host nations, should be our top military/intelligence priority.

I also want to say something about the key elements of an effective political strategy. It includes, but is not confined to: (1) more support for Pakistan; (2) helping the Saudis weaken the Wahhabi influence; (3) building new bridges to Muslim moderates; and (4) developing customized policies for the most important Muslim countries like Iran, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Indonesia.

**Pakistan.** Pakistan is a major key to success. General Musharraf has allied Pakistan with the West. The militants have tried to assassinate him twice. Pakistan continues to harbor enormous numbers of Al Qaeda and other militants who are not under the control of the government. From a U.S. policy point-of-view, Musharraf needs massive U.S. support to crack down on Al Qaeda.

**Saudi Arabia.** The most difficult of all the challenges we face, the most subtle and controversial, is how to work with the Saudis to weaken the Wahhabi influence that goes back some 200 years. Until recently, we have taken the easy way out by turning a blind eye to Saudi appeasement of Wahhabi extremism. It has been Saudi citizens and Saudi money that have supported most of the hate-America madrassas throughout the Muslim world. They get these young men when they’re kids. They brainwash them and drill hate-America venom into them. Even today in Indonesia the madrassas are Saudi-staffed and Saudi-supported. The main source of terrorist money and rabid anti-Americanism remains the Wahhabi influence.
Finding a way of keeping the Saudi government in power while loosening its bonds to Wahhabi extremists requires a very delicate balancing act. In discussions I have had with foreign policy experts, no subject has been more controversial with more divided opinion than how to accomplish this objective.

**New links to moderates.** The policy that is the most important from the perspective of people like myself is how to build new links to Muslim moderates. This involves a wide variety of actions, including paying much more attention to legitimate Palestinian grievances. There’s just no way that we can skip over that hurdle. We need to be able to engage in constructive dialogue with moderates in that part of the world. We need to involve Arab nations in the Iraq peace process. We need to show, through our relations to moderate Islamist democracies such as Turkey, that we can live with cultures that are modeled not on American values but on Muslim values. We need to acknowledge that moderates in the Muslim world have a legitimate vision to build peaceful, free, and prosperous Islamist societies in accordance with their own values. And we need to develop a new mutual understanding that if the moderates help to stop the hate-America terrorists we will help them achieve their own vision of just, prosperous societies. Basically, that is the heart and soul of a new policy.

We’re going to have to find ways to cooperate with Muslim moderates to find constructive outlets for their frustrated youth – training, education, jobs and so forth. That’s something we can do, and it’s something that is very important to them.

Our religious community has not been as active as it ought to be in initiating dialogues with religious Muslim moderates to demonstrate that our religious values are compatible with the teachings of Islam, rather than giving the militants free reign on their perverse interpretation of Islam.

In brief, in building bridges to moderate Muslims, we need to support their efforts to develop prosperous societies that reflect their own values, not our values. And, above all, we need to present a new vision of America to the Muslim world by positioning U.S. foreign policy
on the side of justice, because the present perception is that the United States is always to be found on the side of injustice.

**Chart 16:** I can sum up by saying that we have both an immediate goal and a long-term goal. The long-term goal is to demonstrate to moderate Muslims that the United States is on the side of justice, not injustice. The immediate goal is to slow or stop the recruitment of new terrorists.

Finally, I would like to make a few suggestions about how I think the current situation will play out. These are not predictions, per se, but implications given the logic of the situation. Over the next few months, we are likely to see Iraq shifted onto the back burner like
Afghanistan, with a lower call on people, money, and attention. Not in a matter of years, but in a matter of months.

I think that this is likely to happen, more likely than most people presuppose. With luck, we may see a lessening of the bitter polarization in our own nation as we shift from an Iraq-centered strategy that splits the country down the middle to an Al Qaeda-centered strategy that unites Americans behind a common goal. I hope we will begin to put more stress on compromise and cooperation with allies as we work to regain our credibility as world leaders. I hope we can develop both a long-term and short-term strategy for isolating the Al Qaeda militants. We need to do whatever we have to do with our Muslim allies to weaken and destroy the Al Qaeda cells in their nations. And above all I hope we will begin to think differently about the Muslim world – starting almost from scratch to build a constructive new relationship with the part of the world that we don’t understand, and that doesn’t understand us.

**Stephen Heintz:** Thank you very much for an extraordinarily thoughtful and provocative analysis of where we find ourselves nearly three years after 9/11. Now, to help us put Dan’s analysis and social science perspective into a foreign policy perspective. It is my great pleasure to introduce the very distinguished president of the Council of Foreign Relations, Richard Haass. We are delighted to see you here, Richard.

As many people here know, prior to joining the Council last year in 2003, Richard served as the director of policy planning in the State Department. He was, while there, a principal advisor to Secretary of State, Colin Powell. Among other things, he served as coordinator for U.S. policy in Afghanistan. He was a leader in the support of a Northern Ireland peace process. He was involved in just about every major foreign policy question that came onto the agenda of the Bush Administration, and served very well in very difficult times in a very tough position. He also served in prior administrations and also worked at Brookings where he was an extraordinarily prolific scholar, and author. He’s one of the most thoughtful, one of the most
candid, one of the most refreshing foreign policy experts and policy makers I have ever had the opportunity to work with. And, he was recognized by his colleagues in the State Department as such with the very high honor of their Distinguished Honor Award.

Richard Haass: So much of what Dan had to say made sense to me that I can’t stand up here and give you a broadside or a critique. I agree with most of it. I agree with where he began. I’ll get to some points where we are different, but I agreed with where he began.

The essence is that a good chunk of the Arab and Muslim world, as well as a good chunk of Europe, our traditional allies, are essentially alienated from us. Anti-Americanism is as intense, as broad, and as deep as it’s been at certainly any time since Vietnam—in some ways, possibly more so. It is useful to deconstruct anti-Americanism though, because it has three different sources. I find it useful to think of it that way, because if you think of it that way analytically, it leads you to different directions prescriptively. Two of the sources I believe we can do something about, and one we can’t.

What are the three sources? The first is inequality. Some anti-Americanism is the inevitable consequence of disparity, strength, and power. It doesn’t particularly bother me. There’s not a lot we can do about it, in the sense that we’re not going to engineer our own decline. It is just something we have to take into account and be sensitive to. Any relationship between unequals tends to breed resentment, whether in personal life or in political life.

There are, however, two other areas of anti-Americanism that we can, if we choose, do something about. One is policy. Anti-Americanism is not an irrational thing. In many cases, it’s quite rational in that it’s based upon policy differences. In the Middle East, for example, a big chunk of anti-Americanism historically is due to the perception that the United States is not using its power and its strength to do enough to bring about a fair, just, and equitable settlement
of the Palestinian question. The United States may or may not choose to address that issue. It may or may not chose to anywhere adjust its policy. But, that is something that we, if we so chose, we could do. Similarly, Iraq has clearly intensified the degree of anti-Americanism.

The third area is tone and style. To some extent, anti-Americanism is a function of not what it is we are doing, but how we are doing it. If you remember the first thing I just said, there being inequality, if you are that much stronger, it behooves you to be sensitive to how it is you are perceived. It doesn’t cost us anything to be careful about how we comport ourselves in the world.

The good news to this, by the way, is that a lot of the anti-Americanism, if I’m right, is not what I would call structural. It’s not permanent. There are things we can and might choose to do about policy, and there are certainly things we should choose to do about tone and style, that would reduce, although not eliminate, the levels of anti-Americanism. In addition, if Iraq does begin to go fairly well, you will see a reduction in the visibility and size of the American presence. If this happens, the degree of anti-Americanism that is attributed to Iraq will begin to subside. If the next administration, be it Bush 2 or Kerry 1, were to take a slightly more active role in the Palestinian question, again, I think you’d see anti-Americanism subside to a significant degree.

Let me go ahead and go to Iraq, then I will turn to terrorism. I agree that the war in Iraq has clearly led to the sort of disenchantment that you saw in those numbers, which are quite striking, as is the degree of political movement in a short amount of time. It is really quite striking. It’s because, to use my own analysis again, Iraq turns out to be a very expensive war of choice. There are essentially two kinds of wars in American history. There are wars of necessity and wars of choice. Wars of necessity are just that, wars which are brought to us. I’d call World War II a war of necessity. I’d call the Korean War a war of necessity. I would call the Gulf War in 1990-91 a war of necessity. History suggests that in wars of necessity, the American people are prepared to pay an enormous price to right things.
With wars of choice, though—and I would call Vietnam the principal war of choice in contemporary history, and I would call Iraq a war of choice – history suggests that there is less tolerance. Mounting costs, particularly when the costs are mounting in a context where the trajectory doesn’t seem to be going well, are trouble. Americans are prepared to pay an enormous cost for necessity. If it is a war of choice, but the trajectory is going right, if the arrows are pointing in the right direction, there will be support. But, where Americans tend to get disenchanted and lose heart is when wars of choice turn out to be expensive, and the arrows are not pointing in the right direction. I think you’re seeing elements of that in Iraq.

As I said, I want to turn to the war on terror, but we can’t ignore Iraq in that context. I don’t think Iraq began as a battlefield in the war on terror. There, I part with my former employers. With that said, I would say two things. One is “so what,” in the sense that it is still terribly important for what it is, given that Iraq is home to the world’s second largest oil reserves, given its location, and given the commitment we’ve made. At some point, involvement creates stakes, and I think the United States has created stakes. That’s why it now does feed into the war on terror.

If the United States were to decide that the Iraqi commitment was not worth seeing through, it would inflame terrorism. It would in some ways be a much bigger version of what happened in Lebanon two decades ago, when the United States essentially got run out. A lot of bad people took from that the lesson that the United States lacks legs or staying power. You kill a couple of Americans and they turn. It happened again in Mogadishu. This would be that on steroids. Leaving Iraq in a hurry would only build up terrorists, and weaken the morale of those who have worked against terrorists.

You can argue, and I think it is a legitimate argument, that Iraq was not originally a battlefield in the war on terror. But it has become one. For all the symbolic and political reasons—also there are a lot of terrorists there—but I do think it has to be seen in that way.

Dan is right to say in general the war on terrorism is more about politics than military things. Let me, again, give you some categories. Let me draw two sets of distinctions. One is the
difference between today’s terrorists who exist, and tomorrow’s terrorists who we want to avoid becoming terrorists. Today’s terrorists, particularly the Al Qaeda variety, I don’t believe there is a political response to them. We either kill them, or disrupt them, or they kill us and disrupt us. Once you are that hardcore, once you have agendas like they have—I don’t care how big the Palestinian state is, these guys have decided what their career path is. To them, there’s no political answer. The answer is to go after them and disrupt them using intelligence, law enforcement, and military force.

We have to help protect ourselves, and that means everything from hardening embassies, and alas, building them out of downtown, sometimes with walls, to all the things we should be doing in the realm of homeland security. The more discouraging thing is consequence management. You have to assume that sometimes these guys are going to succeed. You, then, have to be prepared to minimize the consequences. That leads into civil defense, vaccines, and all those kinds of preparations because we will not bat a thousand at preventing them. They don’t have to bat a thousand in order to hurt us. Shades of what the IRA once told Mrs. Thatcher.

For today’s extreme terrorists and the existential terrorists, I do think there’s only essentially a military and physical answer, not a political answer.

But there’s a fundamental distinction between these people and those who are potential terrorist recruits. A big part of American foreign policy has to be to try to encourage these young men and women—mainly men—to choose alternative career paths. I think the best way to do it is through the reform of their societies. It is everything from political reform, to economic reform, to educational reform, to civil reform, education, in particular literacy rates in girls, which turns out to be a very important driver of development. I would probably put a lot of emphasis on economic reform in these societies.

The only caveat is I would not rush elections. I don’t think anyone should ever confuse political reform with elections. You do not want to have an election in the absence of checks and balances in societies. Political elections need to occur in a context of constitutional and societal reform. They are a part of the process, but, to put it bluntly, we should not confuse democracies
with “electocracies.” We ought to get that straight. But, I do think we are talking about decades of effort, using everything that our society has to bring to bear. This goes way beyond government. This is an endeavor for foundations, for universities, for American corporations. American corporations had a large impact in places like South Africa. American corporations should have a large impact throughout the world.

In addition to this distinction between today’s Al Qaeda-like terrorists and potential terrorists, there’s also probably a distinction—and I realize I’m on thin ice here—between existential and traditional terrorists. For existential terrorists, like the Al Qaeda terrorists, there’s no political response. I do think, though, for some terrorists, there is. For example, I spent several years dealing with the IRA and with their political wing Sein Fein. In the Middle East, I do think there are some people who have adopted terrorism as a tactic, rather than as a way of life. For those people, without in any way saying that it’s tolerable or acceptable, so don’t get me wrong, I do think there are policy responses that are available.

If tomorrow, for example, there was significant progress in the Israeli/Palestinian problem, it would not affect for a second what Al Qaeda does. It would not affect for a second what some of the most radical Palestinians will do. They don’t want a two-state solution. But, it would affect those who directly or indirectly support Palestinian terrorism, who do favor a two-state solution. I think, again, there are policy responses that would not eliminate terrorism, but that would have an effect on it. I’m not necessarily arguing for them. You’ve got to look at them case by case. But, at least it ought to be on the agenda for decision makers. You’ve got to come in weigh the pros and cons of a policy response.

In Iraq, for example, there’s a difference between the Al Qaeda terrorism, which is existential, and some of the Sunni terrorism, which is more traditional terrorism against what they perceive to be a foreign occupying presence. There are things that we can and, I would argue, should do in order to reduce our profile.

As you see the interim government become more and more visible, more and more capable, I predict some of that terrorism will fade. I actually think this dynamic we’re just
beginning to see, this tension, between Iraqis who are using terrorist methods to attack the occupation—I’m not condoning it, I’m just explaining it—and those foreigners in Iraq who are using terrorism simply to get at “the great Satan.” There is potential tension between those groups. Whereas at the moment they may overlap, it’s a tactical overlap, not a strategic overlap. It ought to be a goal of American foreign policy to drive a strategic wedge between them so that Iraqis turn on the foreigners who have goals, if you will, that transcend Iraq and are just using Iraq as a battlefield to fit their battle. Iraqis do not, for the most part, want to see Iraq used as a battlefield. They’ve seen enough of that. Again, there are potential policy things that can be done here.

I don’t much like the metaphor of a war on terrorism. Though we have used it tonight, I recommend that people jettison it for a couple of reasons. Where war is fought between soldiers for the most part, terrorism isn’t. The favorite victims of terrorism, almost the definition of the victims of terrorism, are non-soldiers. They are innocent men, women, and children. Wars tend to be fought on battlefields. With terrorism, everything is a battlefield, whether it’s downtown New York, or supermarkets, shopping malls, or what have you.

Wars tend to be fought with traditional weapons, tanks, guns, and artillery. Terrorism can be fought with cars, box cutters, or civilian airliners. Wars tend to have beginnings and ends. It might be 30 years, like the 30 Years War, or it might be a half-dozen years, like the World Wars. I don’t see the war on terrorism having an end. I actually think, particularly for the existential terrorists, it is structural. It is going to be with us for the rest of our lives. It’s now part of the woodwork of contemporary life.

As a result, I much prefer the metaphor of disease. You do not eradicate disease for the most part. You fight it. You do things to try to stomp it out. You do things to try to reduce your vulnerability to it. Once you catch disease, you do things to mitigate the consequences.

That’s what the war on terrorism is about. You fight it in different ways with different tools, almost a spectrum of tools. But, at the end of the day, I think a realistic goal, the definition of success, has to be to reduce it to what I would call a nuisance or to where it does not exact a
tremendous toll on our way of life, either the quality of life or life itself. That’s probably a realistic definition of success.

There’s not going to be a big surrender ceremony for the war on terrorism. It’s not going to work that way. It is structural. What we need to do is essentially find the way to reduce it to a tolerable or manageable level. That is ambitious enough given the fact that part of the dark side of globalization is the empowerment or super-empowerment of individual terrorists. We have reduced the monopoly of violence that used to belong to states and large organizations. We have democratized access to violence. That’s what part of globalization has done. We can’t expect to eliminate it. We’re going to have to cope with it. At times the terrorists will succeed. I worry that on occasion they will succeed with access to an ever more horrific, ever more destructive weaponry. Again, there will be lost battles. There will be bad days in this open-ended struggle, just like there are bad days in the battle or struggle against disease. But, I think this is a part of life. Again, I don’t think it’s an unrealistic goal, but it is an ambitious goal all the same. I’ll leave it at that.

Stephen Heintz: I’m sure we have stimulated lots of questions. I would like for you, when you rise, to be recognized, and pose your brief question.

Question: Dan, about your data. Obviously, the data about American public opinion show some very precipitous declines in support for our current policy. It suggests a certain volatility in public opinion. I suspect that—you can contradict this if I’m wrong—that if things started to go well in some respect, the American public opinion could turn just as quickly around. It could become more favorable. If Osama Bin Laden were killed or captured, if we had elections in Iraq, and the little violence begins to subside—there are things out there that could probably trigger a very different response.
What worries me more, though, are the data from Muslim countries. I wonder if you can comment on whether or not that data is as likely to be turned around or reversed as easily as American public opinion might do.

**Daniel Yankelovich:** I thought that Richard’s deconstruction of anti-Americanism was very helpful. I’m convinced from everything I’ve seen that anti-Americanism in the Muslim world is not, to use Richard’s term, structural. It is based on policy, on distortion, on frustration.

After World War II, many Muslim countries tried Marxism, and most have gone from one oppressive government to another, particularly Arab countries. These people are frustrated. They see us as standing in their way. I feel that we can change that perception, and we could be seen as helping them, as reducing injustice. We can transform perceptions. We can narrow the group of hate-Americans to a small core of radicals. We can live with that. What’s happening now is not livable.

**Question:** Because these two presentations are rather congruent, I would like to cite two issues where it seemed to me there were important differences.

Your long-term goal, Dan, was to influence the moderates into believing that we are on the side of justice. Your short-term goal was to stop recruiting, which seems to me the result of your long-term goal, which is to say that it would be very hard to stop the recruiting until we accomplish the long-term goal.

I would be interested in one or the other of you trying to reconcile that and indicate what specific steps we will take now, unless it is perhaps what Richard was talking about, which is disposing of Al Qaeda, which would seem to me one of the alternative short-term goals that would have your desired result. There may be others.
Let me just raise the other point. I think you made the clear statement that it is not who we are, but what we do that affects both of the extremists and the moderates. Richard took a different point of view, it seemed to me, on that. I would be interested on what data you base that assumption. I happen to strongly believe that with the extremists, no matter what we do, it won’t change their hate of who we are. So, that is, I think, a clear contradiction between the two of you.

**Daniel Yankelovich:** I don’t think there’s a contradiction. I said the same thing as Richard. You can’t reason with what Richard called the existentialist terrorists. They’re out to kill us. You have to strike back at them. I think Richard had a very useful elaboration of the point that I was making. You have to go country by country and find ways that you can cooperate with them in sharing intelligence and in weakening Al Qaeda cells, which is very different from the long-term strategy, because it’s basically a military use of force.

**Question:** First, let me say, I thought those were both the most brilliant analyses of this issue that I’ve heard in any place. I want to congratulate both Dan and Richard.

It seems to me that we got into this situation through accommodation of arrogance and deceit. But, there’s a third issue, and that’s competence. Here I applaud what was suggested that—at least I took this to be said—that we need to help Muslim societies improve their educational systems. Make that contribution a reform. In like fashion, I think we need to learn more about the Islamic world. I spoke to a group of U.N. Ambassadors to the Muslim societies last year, and said most Americans have never met a Muslim. We don’t know anything about Islam.

I think one of the reasons we’ve got into so much trouble in Vietnam, in Iran, in Iraq, in Central America, and elsewhere, is just ignorance of those societies, which brings me to my final point: competence. Obviously, we would militarily conquer a country like Iraq. How do you
explain the monumental incompetence with which the government of the United States handled the aftermath?

Now, I have read that the Department of State had put together a plan, but the Department of Defense said, “We don’t want to talk to you.” Was it purely ideology in DOD, Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld, and Cheney? Was that what caused it? How can we have confidence that we’re going to have enough brains to make rational decisions? I suppose that is what this election is all about.

Daniel Yankelovich: That’s the ideal question that Richard has to answer.

Richard Haass: There are a couple of things to be said. First, analysis is only as good as the assumptions. If you plug in assumptions that are wrong, it shouldn’t surprise you that the conclusions are going to be flawed. In this case, for example, a lot of people thought that the aftermath would be what you might describe in social science as a lesser-included case of the war. This assumption turned out to be fundamentally flawed. The idea that what came afterwards was somehow going to be easier was just fundamentally wrong.

Second, I think people just had certain predictions or assessments that were flat out wrong. Clearly the prediction about how the Iraqis were going to welcome us with flowers, and the idea that it was going to be fairly orderly. People who made these decisions received lots of predictions to the contrary. I think it’s human nature to alter and discount analysis and predictions that don’t fit with your own policy preferences.

I believe it would have been far wiser to have had the Pentagon only in charge of the security dimension of the aftermath, but not the entire aftermath. It should have been handled as an interagency, national security council-driven exercise from the get-go.
There was some arrogance. I think there was a desire to keep others out of it. It’s hard to imagine in retrospect. People wondered, “Why should the United States welcome others to enjoy the fruits of our labor, the benefits of our military victory?” I know that may seem rather ludicrous, given what’s happened. But such arguments were made.

Look at the lessons of our occupations, or the lessons of the occupation of Germany. The original plans for denazification were dramatically scaled down very quickly. Recognizing that the average person had to join the Nazi party in order to have work, you ruled out working with the top level people, but not the low level workers and those running operating systems. In Iraq, you pretty much had to be a member of the Baathist Party if you were a member of the military. That did not mean you were directing the warfare. Average Iraqis joined the Baathists, this was the way you punched your ticket. We never should have ruled out entirely working with all or even most Baathists.

There could have been a misreading of the situation in Iraq, or a lack of appreciation of history. But, again, it’s stemming from an assumption that it wasn’t going to be that hard. If you assume that it wasn’t going to be that hard, especially if you assumed you would have a fairly welcoming society that essentially wanted to work with you rather than resist you, a lot of things flowed from that original assessment. Unfortunately, that assessment was wrong.

Question: Richard has mentioned the role of foundations and other nongovernmental actors. So, before I ask my question, I want to publicly thank Rockefeller Brothers Fund and Public Agenda for organizing this really marvelous session that is so timely and so provocative. Thank you very much for that. A role for foundations is certainly to help with public dissemination of important ideas, and to interesting people.

What I wanted to ask is going forward and dealing with the potential terrors, or recruits to terrorism. Both of you made it sound very simple to deal with that, and that we just need to get the policies right. One of the things we know from the last 50 years is that our development assistance policies have not always been right. This is really what you’re calling for, is for the
foreign policy establishment to give more respect and more weight to our development assistance, knowledge, and to give more resources to that.

It also calls for working more closely with the United Nations, where, in many cases, some of the specialized agencies do know how to get it right. But then, they really need more resources and more respect to get it right. What I would be interested in, from both of you, is how are we going to build the respect and inclusion of development policy experts, and the United Nations, and possibly experts from those regions of the world that are most affected by the changing dynamics of the political situation, and our own situation, such as people from Indonesia, who know people from Thailand, who are familiar with people from India and China, who really know how their own conditions and those of their neighbors? What are the policies that we are going to enact to make that happen?

**Richard Haass:** First, let me say I don’t think Dan was up here saying it was simple. I think both of us were saying to the contrary, it’s incredibly complex. It’s going to take decades. It’s going to take enormous resources. As a rule of thumb, the hardest foreign policy task I know is engineering other societies. That’s essentially what we’re talking about here. This is nation-building, if you will, on a fairly grand scale. Not with occupation, but we are basically going to try to help these societies modernize. With the oil societies, oil has proved to be a curse, enabling them to bypass the normal paths of modernization. You’ve had autocracies in most of these places. These are the most troubled societies in the world. It’s actually hard to exaggerate the difficulties. With that said, you’ve got no alternative. We’ve got to do it.

Foundations have a responsibility here. They have got to be among those who are essentially providing resources for this to happen. I think you need an awful lot of intellectual input at the moment. Businesses, as I have suggested, have a role to play. Governments have an enormous role.

Essentially now, this is all on the agenda of U.S. and European relations. The E.U. has this enormous pot of money from the so-called Barcelona Initiative. This is a pretty good use for
that. We will find ways to put up enormous sums of money out of the U.S. government, and also from U.S. society. There are exchanges. We ought to be making it easier, not tougher, for people to be getting into the United States to experience an open society. As a brief aside, let me just say that one of the intellectual fathers of the Islamic resistance and supporter of terrorism once came to America to study, and at a church social saw unmarried men and women dancing together and got wigged out by it. He went back home convinced of the evil nature of American society. So, there are potential downsides to cultural exchanges. Still, we should go ahead with them.

Micro-grants for a civil society, development training programs for journalists. I talked about literacy programs. A good test will be what American government leaders do. We’ve got to keep talking about this publicly. We’ve got to create some space for this. That means, when the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, or others go out, they ought to be talking about it in ways that make it easier, not more difficult, for local activists to operate.

When the President meets with leaders of Muslim countries, he can spend half the meeting talking about Iraq and the Palestinian problem, but a chunk of that meeting should be the President saying, for example, “Now let’s talk about Egypt.” Because what happens in Egypt matters. Egypt is 1/3 of the Arab world. What happens then? It’s not just their domestic problem. It becomes our domestic problem.

The same thing happens in Saudi Arabia. Their domestic problem becomes our domestic problem. This now has to find a place on the foreign policy agenda. This is anything but a traditional issue. This has got to become a foreign policy for us, which is essentially talking about their domestic challenges. This is something that just never made its way on to the agenda before. The true test will be in a year, or three, or five years from now, whether this issue occupies a big chunk of American foreign policy towards these countries.

Daniel Yankelovich: I would like to add one or two points, if I may. One of the advantages of finding a different metaphor would be that “war on terror” seems to exclude the private sector,
whereas if you have another metaphor, whether the disease one or another one, the role of the private sector is seen as important, and probably more important, than the role of government.

One of extraordinary aspects of the incompetence has been the total exclusion of the private sector. Now, both Rockefeller Brothers and Carnegie, two of the foundations represented here, have started very productive programs on dialogues, -- Muslim and American dialogues. I think that we have to start with the fact that we don’t understand the Muslim world, and they don’t understand us. We don’t know where they’re coming from. They don’t know where we’re coming from. We’re not talking to them. Global business and the religious community need to take a more active role. The foundations not only bring resources, but sometimes convening leadership is as important, if not more important than resources. Having that authority to convene, start, and build these dialogues I think is one of the long-term ways that we can begin to get our teeth into this issue.

**Stephen Heintz:** I think one of the unusual things that has happened here is that those questions thus far have had very little public discussion. I think this is what you are saying, Richard and Dan. It’s fascinating.

Back in the end of April, the Democratic staff of the House Select Committee on Homeland Security issued a fascinating report. I wonder how many people in this room even know that it happened. It is a several-hundred page report, including a whole series of recommendations designed to reduce the breeding ground of terrorism, to help prevent the recruiting of additional terrorists. It included among other things, a proposal that the United States spend $10 billion over ten years to improve education in Arab countries in secular schools, and to help Arab countries that would match that amount, or double the amount that they are putting into public education, to create new secular schools in Arab societies. It included a Marshall Plan-like proposal to simulate economic development to help reduce the disparity and create jobs and hope for these millions and millions of young Muslims, who today feel they have no hope and no sense of possibility with it.
This would require a $200 billion program over ten years, half coming from the United States’ sources and half from our allies. Did anybody hear about it? It got buried. Nobody’s debating it. Why aren’t we talking about these development challenges? Why isn’t it a part of the policy mix? What’s preventing us from getting away from the metaphor of war and getting to the metaphor of improving the quality of life?

**Question:** I had the opportunity last June to participate in one of the Rockefeller Foundation’s conversations with ten Americans and ten Saudis. I was, among many other things, surprised to hear the anger in the Saudis that Americans didn’t understand that an unstated agreement had been constructed by the U.S. and the Saudi royal family to give the Wahhabi the opportunity to in fact promulgate their version of Islam throughout Saudi Arabia, in return for protecting the royal family.

Of course, that would protect our oil interests. They said to us, “How can you blame us now for Wahhabi?” Of course, most Americans didn’t know that. So, I want to second the importance of a much richer discussion.

Can we see in the Islamic world someone with the intellectual power and the religious following of Wahhabi who could become a partner, not so that he compromised himself, but so that we had another kind of Islam to connect to, that wasn’t asking, “Who did this to us?” but “How did we get here?” which is the essential question that Bernard Lewis has been framing?

**Richard Haass:** Let me give you a conditional response—not quite a yes, but to some extent, in the sense that there’s not going to be a single voice. Islam is too varied and too divided nationally. The voices who matter the most in Indonesia are often different than the voices who might matter most in Egypt or something like that. It’s not that centralized or organized. That said, there are liberal voices in Islam. There are more tolerant voices in Islam.
We looked at this when I was in the government. I came to the conclusion that some of those voices were out there, but they did not enjoy anything like the same access to resources. In a sense, they had a much smaller megaphone. Those who had more radical, less tolerant voices had many more resources, many more opportunities to spread their message on TV. TV is by far the most powerful tool. Also what is said in mosques. Those who had more liberal voices were also intimidated, often physically intimidated, including in this country, by the way. More liberal Muslim voices in this country have talked to me privately about the physical intimidation that they feel and they fear.

There’s got to be a leveling of the playing field. That’s something I’ve had conversations with Muslims about and with governments about, about putting in resources. It’s also things that Dan mentioned before. It’s awkward for the U.S. government to get involved in this. But, there are ways, again, private sources, where resources can be funneled, or even through cutouts. I mean, there are ways of doing it. We’ve got to find ways of empowering and protecting tolerant voices.

Then, I think Stephen and others mentioned the idea—there’s got to be other institutions. Take Pakistan. You can try to improve the madrassahs system in Pakistan a little bit. It’s going to be tough. The government, as you know, backed off trying to do that recently. People send their kids to madrassahs in Pakistan. Why? Because it’s free. You get room and board. With a poor family with too many children, it’s an answer. The answer, then, it seems to me, is a much better, secular, public educational system which parents can send their kids to. That’s where, again, you want to plow resources into that, not just quantity, but improving the quality of schools—that’s a longer-term answer.

The Saudis have had a terrible impact here. It’s not out of a conspiracy. It wasn’t like the United States said, “As long as you give us oil or bases, you can spread your venom.” It just wasn’t on the agenda. We didn’t pay attention. The real danger from Saudi Arabia is not so much the hundred millions of dollars a year that are going into Al Qaeda, although we obviously want to stop that. We’ve made considerable progress. The bigger problem is this. It’s the hundreds and hundreds of millions of dollars, the billions of dollars, that are going into the spread of
Wahabbi doctrine around the Islamic world. That doesn’t fall into the guides of terrorist financing. But, that does fall very much into what you might call the financing of radicalism, of anti-Americanism, which is a way-station for some percentage of people who one day become terrorists. We’ve got to get that on the agenda. That’s a difficult thing. But, that has to increasingly get on the foreign policy agenda.

Daniel Yankelovich: I would like to add a point. I think the place to start is Egypt. Egypt is the intellectual capital of the Arab world. The fellow who came to the United States and caused all that trouble later after seeing the dancing in our churches became the main theorist in the 1920s of the ideology that supports Al Qaeda – a man named Sayyid Qutb.

Ideology is terribly important. Just from a tactical point of view, if I were to start on that project, I would focus on Egypt. Now, Mubarak doesn’t like the idea of identifying terrorists with Egyptians. But, al-Zawahiri, who is probably more important than Osama Bin Laden in Al Qaeda’s planning is Egyptian. The Egyptian piece has been pushed under the rug. I think it’s true that it’s Saudi money that is feeding the madrassas, but maybe Egyptian intellectual leadership could find the way out of it. At least, it is something that could be explored.

[closing comments.]

END
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Encouraging public deliberation and debate on key policy issues is a concern that cuts across all of the Fund’s program areas. To advance that goal with respect to U.S. foreign policy issues, the Fund has joined with The Aspen Institute to publish a communicators’ handbook, *U.S. in the World: Talking Global Issues with Americans – A Practical Guide.*

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212.686.6610 (phone)
212.889.3461 (fax)

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